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1. Introduction. The two books under review (abbreviated as Universe) and Human,
respectively) constitute, together with From Knowledge to Wisdom. A Revolution in the Aims
and Methods of Science (which dates from 1984 and I shall largely ignore whenceforth), a
triptych which we ought to consider as the philosophical legacy of Nicholas Maxwell,
Emeritus Reader at the University of London. A comparison to his hero and teacher in
London during the 1960ies, Karl Popper, is illuminating.
Like Popper, Maxwell takes the problem of induction extremely seriously. Like Pop-
per, Maxwell vehemently rejects the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics,
advocates the propensity-‘interpretation’ of probability, subscribes to ontological inde-
terminism, takes science to be a quest for truth and is a realist. Like Popper, Maxwell
is against reducing the mind to the brain. Like Popper, Maxwell has an unrelinquished
faith in the spirit of the Enlightenment and writes with a passion that sometimes takes
the better of him. Like Popper, Maxwell endorses the peculiar if not contradictory con-
cept of ‘conjectural knowledge’. Like Popper, Maxwell lives in a permanent state of war
with his contemporaries and in his heart believes that if only they were to understand
his views properly, they would see there is no other option than to embrace these views.
But unlike Popper, Maxwell has not yet mobilised a small army of converts who fight his
battles with him side by side. It would be an injustice, however, to let oblivion get a hold
on Maxwell’s entire philosophical legacy, because some of his insights are of everlasting
importance to the philosophy of science, the fact that he stands on the shoulders of giants
(Hume, Popper) notwithstanding.
2. Metaphysical Realism. As the subtitle of Universe says, Maxwell expounds a new
conception of science he has been working on and publishing about for a quarter of a
century; cf. Maxwell [1974]. This conception is a brand of metaphysical realism, aber-
rantly baptised ‘aim-oriented-empiricism’ by Maxwell; we refer to it as MR, where the M
stands for ‘Maxwell’ or ‘Metaphysical’ or ‘Mistaken’ or ‘Magnificent’, and the R for ‘Real-
ism’; in Human, MR is also called ‘post-Popperian Kantianism’ (p. 85). Although Maxwell
claims in Universe that MR covers science generally (p. 46), the book is wholly devoted to
physics.
Maxwell subdivides the whole of our knowledge of the universe in a number of levels
(partly my terminology and simplifications: in reality level 4 comprises four and level 5
two levels):
1. Empirical: the observed phenomena, the evidence.
2. Theoretical: the currently accepted scientific theories.
3. Ontological: the standard ontology (if there is one) that underlies the best of the
currently accepted theories.
4. Metaphysical: several general theses concerning the nature of the universe, such as
physicalism.
5. Transcendental: necessary conditions for the possibility of science.
These levels form a hierarchy in that as we move upward (typographically downward),
knowledge becomes less specific and more general, and by implication less susceptible to
confirmation and refutation by the evidence; but it also becomes “increasingly likely that
these thesis are true” (Human, p. 53), with at the transcendental level bare truths which
are as a priori as statements about the universe possibly can be. In contradistinction to
Popper, Maxwell does not demarcate science from metaphysics sharply but sees the dif-
ference as a matter of degree; our knowledge becomes less scientific and more metaphys-
ical as we move upwards in the hierarchy. Maxwell submits a fairly unexplained notion
of ‘precision’ as indicating ‘how metaphysical’ a theory is: ‘All matter consists of atoms’
is a metaphysical statement because it is very ‘imprecise’, but when seen as part of Dal-
ton’s chemical theory, it is a scientific one because, then, it suddenly has become ‘precise’
(Universe, p. 271). The knowledge-hierarchy has a historical dimemension: it is not fixed
once and for all. This is evident when we look at the first levels: the observed phenomena,
the currently accepted theories, and the ontology that underlies the best of the currently
accepted theories (which Maxwell prefers to call ‘the current blueprint of the universe’).
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At any point in historical time, what is accepted at level n is the best available exemplifi-
cation of what is antecedently accepted at level n + 1 (for n ≥ 2).
The central question is: why adopt MR and its hierarchy? The answer consists of two
parts: a motivation and a justification. The motivation (Chapter 1 of Universe covers this)
is that a competing conception of science — or rather a competing family of conceptions of
science — called ‘Standard Empiricism’ blatantly contradicts a salient although seldomly
mentioned fact about science (read on). The justification (the five subsequent Chapters
cover it) is that Maxwell can solve ten philosophical problems about science which the
competition cannot solve, least of all Standard Empiricism. We shall take these points in
turn.
Motivation. Standard Empiricism (SE) is the view that the decision to accept or to reject
a scientific theory is (ultimately) based exclusively on the available evidence; presumably
as a consequence of this, science accepts no permanent, substantial ‘metaphysical’ theses
about the nature of the universe (as part of our scientific knowledge). Maxwell’s mission
is the destruction of SE. Not only in Universe, but throughout his philosophical triptych
Maxwell fights SE as if his life depended on it — his work certainly does. The salient but
seldomly mentioned fact about science that destroys SE is that scientists instantly reject
‘aberrant’ versions of scientific theories which are equally well, or even better, supported
by the evidence than their ‘normal’ originals; scientists accept only ‘normal’ theories. Ex-
amples of aberrant theories are a version of Newton’s theory of universal gravitation
that only differs from Newton’s theory in that it asserts an inverse-cube-law for golden
spheres having a mass of at least 1 million tons, a ‘Goodmanian version’ asserting that
after 2100 AD the gravitational force becomes an inverse-cube force, and a ‘Humean ver-
sion’ saying that after 2100 AD the gravitational force disappears altogether (Universe, pp.
51-52) For every ‘normal’ theory, there is an infinitude of aberrant versions. These aber-
rant versions do not even enter the scientific competition of Acceptance & Rejection, their
empirical virtues notwithstanding. This proves the overriding importance of being normal,
thus Maxwell concludes. The more silly one finds these aberrant versions, the more silly
one ought to judge SE, because SE enforces one to take these aberrant versions seriously
and often even to prefer them over their normal originals.
Fair enough. The behaviour of scientists flatly contradicts SE. So who defends this
false conception of science? Who is the enemy?
SE is the official ideology of science, allegedly characterising the very nature of sci-
ence in the eyes of the scientists, Maxwell submits. “SE is implicit in what is taught and
discussed in science” (Universe, p. 43). Scientists believe that allowing non-empirical fac-
tors to intrude the difficult process of judging scientific hypotheses and theories would
be an act of betrayal, leading one astray from science, into philosophy, metaphysics or
perhaps worse. Maxwell hopes that Universe makes scientists see the light, so that they
dispense with paying lip-service to a false ideology — and presumably spread the gospel
of MR among their students. In spite of the disappointing fact that Maxwell does not
present lists of references of exhortations of SE by scientists (Poincare´ and Planck, who
passed away some time ago, are the only ones mentioned), I am prepared to give him
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the benefit of the doubt. Anyone who asserts that the Republic of Science is governed by
the facts and nothing but the facts, declares that science is not in the business of making
metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe, is making a statements about sci-
ence that generally will be met with nodding approval from scientists, whereas they are
as false as statements about science can be.
But I withhold the benefit of the doubt from Maxwell when it comes to philosophers of
science, who according to Maxwell “persist in the hopeless endeavour of trying to justify
the unjustifiable doctrine of SE” (ibid.). Maxwell mentions Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos
as friends of SE — who unfortunately are all dead now. The only living philosopher
of science Maxwell mentions as a defender of SE is B.C. van Fraassen. This charge of
Maxwell is, however, mistaken; cf. Muller [2004].
Anyhow, we ought to take the refutation of SE as a Popperian instance of the growth
of our philosophical knowledge about science; a refutation which I take to be an insight
of everlasting importance. But is this refutation sufficient motivation to embrace MR?
According to Maxwell more-or-less so, because the ‘aberrance-argument’ does more than
refute SE. It reveals that the scientific community implicitly accepts a substantial, perma-
nent metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe, namely that the universe is such
that every single aberrant theory is false, or at the very least empirically false (fails to save the
phenomena, false in so far as they talk about actual observables only). Maxwell will not
hear of purely pragmatic stories in favour of the instant rejection of aberrant theories and
the adoption of only normal ones. Such stories are philosophical fairy tales. Scientists
reject aberrant theories not because they are ‘inconvenient’ (they are not), ‘simple’ (a mat-
ter of personal taste?) or whatever, but because they hold that such theories are at least
empirically false (until proven wrong, of course).
Now what is so terribly important about this admission? Well, it is a realist’s con-
fession and therefore philosophically important. Maxwell purportedly has led us to the
conclusion that only some brand of metaphysical realism can make sense of science.
Here Maxwell is trying to make too much philosophical mileage with his aberrance-
argument. Van Fraassen’s partly anti-realist conception of science, with its crucial dis-
tinction between pragmatic acceptance and epistemic belief, can equally well do justice
to the behaviour of scientists. A constructive empiricist can accept the thesis that the uni-
verse is unlike every aberrant theories says it is and can believe that aberrant theories are
empirically false, i.e. false in so far as they talk about actual observables; the acceptance of
this thesis can be justified by arguing that the thesis is expedient for science in achieving
its epistemic aim, which is the construction of empirically true scientific theories. Perhaps
this is a tall story, but it certainly is not a fairy tale — and if it is, Maxwell has not showed
it. Cf. Muller [2004].
Hence my conclusion is that Maxwell’s aberrance-argument leads us out of SE once
and for all, but it does not lead us unavoidably to Maxwell’s brand of metaphysical real-
ism (MR), because there is at least one rival conception of science, i.e. Constructive Em-
piricism, which is well-equipped to deal with the aberrance-argument.
Justification. MR is sufficiently justified as the currently best available conception of
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science if and when it solves the major philosophical problems of science today, which
other, competing conceptions of science do not solve. Ten problems have been selected
by Maxwell where MR cries victory over its competitors; this “provides decisive grounds
for rejecting SE and accepting MR in its stead” (p. 45). I list the first six ones, which seem
by far the most important ones:
(i) Practical Problem of Induction: why do we apply unrefuted yet empirically suc-
cessful theories and rely on them with our lives, e.g. in building bridges, cars and
aeroplanes?
(ii) Methodological Problem of Induction: what methods does science employ to se-
lect theories (which always include generalities) on the basis of a finite number of
particular facts?
(iii) Justificationary Problem of Induction (Hume’s Problem): how to justify these meth-
ods?
(iv) Semantic Problem of Simplicity: what does ‘simplicity’ mean?
(v) Justificationary Problem of Simplicity: how to justify the persistent preference for
simple (hence normal) theories and our persistent rejection of non-simple (hence
aberrant) theories?
Of course, for several of these problems other solutions than Maxwell’s have been
proposed, developed and hotly debated over the past decades. Whenever Maxwell men-
tions some such solution, he either scrutinises it and then criticises it as being no sensible
solution after all, or, if it does look like a sensible solution after scrutiny, he points out that
it fails to solve (most of) the other problems of his list. In the end, Maxwell always wins.
Problems (i)–(v) constitute the problem what the criteria are for choosing a theory or
hypothesis and how to justify these criteria . This is ad fundum the problem of scien-
tific rationality and it shows how broadly Maxwell construes the problems (iv) and (v)
of ‘simplicity’, i.e. to cover all non-empirical conditions (explanatory power, conceptual
coherence, parsimony of ontology, elegance, etc.); their solutions entail solutions of the
problems (i)-(ii) and (iii) of induction, respectively. Hume’s problem and Goodman’s rid-
dle are, in fact, only two instances of an infinitely more general problem, call it Maxwell’s
problem: how to justify our persistent rejection of aberrant theories and our acceptance of only
normal theories? The formulation of this more general problem is another of Maxwell’s
philosophical insights of importance (the justificationary problem of simplicity (iv) thus
comprises Maxwell’s problem).
These are pressing problems indeed, as is problem (viii) of what constitutes scientific
progress (not mentioned in the shortlist above). From now on, I shall restrict my attention
to the problems (iv) and (v) of simplicity.
Like all authors who write about the subject of simplicity in physics, Maxwell first
performs the ritual of explaining that simplicity cannot reside in mathematical form. The
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only way to make simplicity (unity, etc.) a substantial concept, which does justice to
how in particular physicists deploy it, is to look at the content of scientific theories. We
must look at what a theory asserts about the universe, not at how it is asserted. The sub-
jects of metaphysics and ontology thus become unavoidable when discussing simplicity.
Maxwell defines one theory to be simpler than another theory iff it exemplifies the current
ontology (level 3 in the hierarchy of MR) better than its rival. There are several ways in
which it can exemplify the current ontology better than a rival theory; and these ways
give rise to different kinds of one theory being simpler than another one. This seems to
do justice to the complexity of scientists’ judgements about the simplicity of theories. If
MR is adopted antecedently, this definition solves (iv) the semantic problem of simplic-
ity, as well as (v) the justificationary problem of simplicity and hence Maxwell’s problem
in the same strike. For example, Newton’s theory of universal gravitation (call it NG
for brevity) is simpler than a rival which states aberrant behaviour of very heavy golden
spheres (NG*) because, at the time of the inception of NG, the then-current mechanistic
ontology did not make any exceptions with regard to the behaviour of matter for heavy
golden spheres. This explains why the scientific community of the 17th-century would
have preferred NG over NG* if it had been confronted with NG*. In general all aberrant
versions of NG exemplified the mechanistic ontology less than NG did — in spite of that
fact that NG and all its aberrant versions are inconsistent with the mechanistic ontology
because of the presence of actio in distans.
This is a neat idea. But it seems to replace the problem, because I now feel compelled
to ask: why did the then-current mechanistic ontology make no exceptions for heavy MR
has two possible answers on offer. The first is that when it became accepted, it was the
best available exemplification of the then-current ontology it replaced; the second is that
it exemplifies best a thesis higher up in the hierarchy of MR, which rules out exceptional
behaviour for particular types of objects such as heavy golden spheres. The first, histori-
cal answer is weak, because the fog of history provides no firm grounding for anything.
The historical answer boils down to saying: science does so because it did so in the past.
The second, rational answer replaces the problem to the next level. In that case a vicious
circle is avoided, but we have an equally vicious helix if the thus resulting chain of ar-
guments is not firmly grounded at some point. This grounding happens when we reach
the transcendental levels in the hierarchy of MR. Ultimately Maxwell argues that we must
assume metaphysical principles that rule out aberrant theories in order for science-as-we-
know-it to become possible. Scientific progress would come to an end if we were to test
all aberrant versions of some normal theory experimentally (Universe, pp. 192-193).
But transcendental arguments generally are not very good justifications. Suppose
someone holds a shotgun against my head and orders me to cut off my fingers in thin
slices and eat them together with my toe-nails which I have to remove with a pair of pin-
cers. Suppose I ask why I must perform this painful ritual. It is not a very illuminating
answer saying that performing it is a necessary condition for the possibility of my sur-
vival, the truth of this answer notwithstanding. If this were a good justification, then we
might as well argue similarly that using induction is a necessary condition for the pos-
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sibility of science and then claim we have solved Hume’s problem. Such an argument
would not be a solution of (iii) the problem of induction; it would only highlight the
problem.
Besides this, has the vicious Millian circle of justifying induction by making an as-
sumption that can only be grounded inductively really been avoided? Are the theses of
the comprehensibility of the universe (the hierarchy of MR) really distinct from J.S. Mills’
principle of the uniformity of nature? Maxwell answers in the affirmative by claiming
that his transcendental arguments are “a kind of justification which makes no appeal to
the success of science and thus entirely avoids the above fallacy” (pp. 167-168). I beg to
disagree. For if Maxwell argues that the success of science (or the acquisition of knowl-
edge, or other semantic sibling expressions), becomes impossible if we had to test every
single aberrant version of a proposed normal theory rather than wipe them all of the table
with a single sweep, he is establishing a conditional statement: if the success of science
is to be possible, then aberrant theories have to be dismissed without testing them. But
to have the consequent of this conditional, Maxwell needs the antecedent. Of course, we
want the success of science to be possible, but is the success of science possible? That is the
question. Clearly science is successful and it is a modal-logical tautology that if p, then it
is possible that p. But now we need the success of science as a premise. The helix turns
out to be a deformed circle.
This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the content of the theses that are sup-
posed to solve Hume’s Problem. This is the level-9 principle of ‘epistemological non-
maliciousness’: knowledge obtained and tested in our (at most Earthly) environment can
be extrapolated to the entire universe. Clearly this is a kind of induction, which makes
solving Hume’s problem on the basis of this level-9 principle definitely circular. Maxwell
hopes to avoid this Millian circle by arguing that it can only help science to accept the
principle of epistemological non-maliciousness and never hinder it, therefore it is ratio-
nal to accept it (Universe, 188-190). This is exactly similar to the act of desparation that
Pascal committed in his wager to justify his belief in an after-life. Again, we might as well
say that it is justified to use induction because using it can only help and never hinder the
flow of science (glossing over the fact that theologicians regard Pascal’s wager as an in-
sult). This looks like a Millian circle to me, because in this terminology Hume’s problem
reads: why does induction help and never hinder?
Quantum Mechanics. The final Chapter of Universe is devoted to one physical theory in
particular, namely quantum mechanics. Maxwell argues that standard quantum mechan-
ics ought to have been rejected for various reasons. Surprisingly, one reason is that quantum
mechanics is an aberrant physical theory. Here MR enters the picture. By his own admis-
sion, Maxwell is saying that here MR is not able to make sense of physics-as-we-know-it
— because MR advices us to reject all aberrant theories. Rather than conclude that MR
now stands confuted as a conception of science, Maxwell launches a revisionary pro-
gramme to change physics in order to make physics comply again with the precepts of MR
(pp. 228-229). This sounds perhaps more revolutionary than it is, because what it means
is that Maxwell is propounding a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics which
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he hopes will replace the standard Copenhagen-like version in the textbooks of physics
— a dream he presumably shares with all propounders of an interpretation of quantum
mechanics different from the standard one.
Maxwell presents his interpretation as similar to the well-known theory of Ghirardi,
Rimini and Weber (GRW) [1986] — when the last-mentioned appeared at the scene, the
afore-mentioned was already fifteen years old (see Maxwell [1972]) —, but instead of
explicitly amending the Schro¨dinger-equation he lays down a Condition which, when
fulfilled, makes him postulate that all summands but one in the superposition of the state
of composite physical systems decay instantaneously; an indeterministic jump occurs,
with relative frequencies equal to the relevant probabilities provided by quantum me-
chanics (p. 249). The Condition is that the inelastic interaction between the subsystems
becomes negligible, so that they evolve approximately like free systems. An accompany-
ing assertion is that at the end of every measurement-processes this Condition is met; if
true, the notorious measurement problem looks solved. Without quantitative models of a
few types of generic measurement-processes, this assertion is however no more than just
an assertion. Like GRW, Maxwell introduces a new constant of nature, called ε (a small
positive dimensionless number), in order to quantify his Condition. Therefore, like GRW,
Maxwell is propounding a theory which may differ empirically from quantum mechan-
ics. But unlike GRW, who make the collapses occur spontaneously and almost instan-
taneously, independent of whether (certain types of) interactions are present, Maxwell
makes his collapses occur if and only if his Condition is met. Seen in this light, Maxwell’s
interpretation is a half-way house between standard quantum mechanics and the quan-
tum theory of GRW.
In fact, some of the weird features of standard quantum mechanics that GRW are able
to eliminate survive in Maxwell’s version of quantum mechanics, for they do not pass
the Condition. Think of the spin-singlet state. This is a composite system of two non-
interacting particles and fails to meet the Condition because no inelastic interactions are
involved. How to understand physically that one particle is, weirdly, in a superposition
of a spin-state up and a spin-state down, and, even more weirdly, that each particle is in
a superposition of kinematical states of flying in opposite directions? Maxwell remains
silent whereas GRW are able to argue that such a state does not persist over time — it
only exists for a negligible amount of time. Why does Maxwell regard this not “bafflingly
incomprehensible” (p. 228)?
If one is prepared to alter the dynamics of standard quantum mechanics in order
to solve the measurement problem, to introduce a new constant of nature, and to have
no qualms about destroying the beautiful Wignerian symmetry-connexion between the
Schro¨dinger-equation and the Galilean structure of the ambient space-time, there seems
no virtue in stopping half-way. If the sacrifice is made, then one should try to squeeze the
most out of it, which is precisely what Maxwell has not done.
My overall conclusion is that Universe is an ideal book for a reading group in phi-
losophy of science or in philosophy of physics. Many of the pressing problems of the
philosophy of science are lively discussed, controversial solutions are passionately de-
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fended and some new insights are provided; in particular the chapter on simplicity in
physics deserves to be read by all philosophers of physics — the critical tone of my dis-
cussion of some of Maxwell’s claims should not cloud these valuable facts, but should be
understood as a corroboration of them.
3. Metaphysical Dualism. As the subtitle of Human says, this book is about conscious-
ness, free will and evolution. This time the enemy is every single philosopher who has
ignored what might be called the hardest problem. It is “the central, fundamental problem
in philosophy” (Human, p. 3):
For if we are merely extremely complex physical phenomena, how can our lives have
any meaning of value? How can our inner world of sensations, feelings and thoughts
exist? How can we be sentient and conscious? How can have mind or a soul? How
can we control, and be responsible for, what we think, decide and do if all that we
do and are unfolds in accordance with precise physical law? (. . .) How can anything
that gives meaning and value to our life exist if we are in reality nothing but complex
physical phenomena?
The hardest problem also shows its face in religion, Maxwell argues, where it is the prob-
lem how to reconcile the hypothesis of an omnipotent, benign creator with the enormous
and continuous suffering in this world (Human, pp. 6-10). The flourishing of the philos-
ophy of mind over the past decades Maxwell welcomes as a sign that the philosophical
community is coming to its senses. No lonely wars here anymore.
The core of Maxwell’s solution of the hardest problem is a follows: there are, as a
matter of brute fact, to be accepted bluntly, “two aspects to what exists, the physical on
the one hand, and the mental, experiental, or human, on the other.” (Human, p. 11). This
amendation of Cartesian Dualism prima facie does not look very promising: it will lead
to re-statements of all the problems that haunt Cartesian Dualism rather than providing
solutions of these problems, in particular of the mind-body problem (nowadays called
‘the hard problem’). Maxwell is too good a philospher not to recognise this, but has lit-
tle inclination to belabour the point; instead he quickly goes on to argue that his view is
a considerable improvement on Cartesian Dualism and is vastly superior to competing
views, notably varieties of Idealism (Berkeley, Kant) and of Reductionism (Smart, Den-
nett, Kim). The two sides of the hard problem that Maxwell is willing to face are: first,
how to understand the mental and the place of the mind in nature, in particular in the
light of the fact that everything science seems capable of doing is to explain and to de-
scribe the brain better in a completely mindless way; and secondly, how to understand
the interaction between the mental and the physical, between the mind and the brain, in
particular the place of free will in a universe governed by natural law. Seven of nine chap-
ters of Human deal with expounding the solutions to these (and related) problems and in
criticising rival solutions. We take a quick look at these two sides of the hard problem.
Ad. The Problem of the Place of the Mind in Nature. There are two distinct aspects of what
there is and there are, Maxwell adjoins, two concomitant realms of explanation and un-
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derstanding, which are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The better we under-
stand something mentally, the poorer we understand it physically, and conversely. Phys-
ical understanding, or more generally scientific understanding involves causality, deduc-
tive arguments and quantitative modelling, whereas mental understanding is a combina-
tion of imitation and imagining, which are mental activities. Who wants to explain and
understand the mind scientifically is making a category-mistake and is embarking on a
doomed enterprise. Thus rather than a solution of the hard problem Maxwell provides a
dissolution of it.
Why do these two aspects exist, the mental and the physical? Maxwell has no answer.
Was the physical there before the mental? Yes. How did the mental came into existence?
To this question Maxwell sketches an evolutionary answer. Consciousness has evolved
gradually in living organisms because it provided enormous evolutionary advantages to
have it. “Life unknowingly breeds itself into existence.” (p. 174) Darwin was not only
a scientist, he was also a philosopher, for the theory of evolution explains the gradual
development of purposiveness (living is goal-pursuing) in a purposelesness universe and
this explanation contributes to a solution of the hardest problem, which is a philosophical
problem.
Ad. The Problem of Physical-Mental Interaction. The processes that occur in our heads
(‘head-processes’) have a brain-aspect and a mind-aspect. Maxwell declares neurological
processes in the brain and mental processes in the mind, inner experiences, to be “contin-
gently identical” (pp. 16, 102); this is intended in the same sense as saying that water is
contingently identical to H2O, that temperature is contingently identical to the motion of
molecules, etc. Thus the mind and the brain are contingently identical. Asking, then, how
the mind can interact with the brain is like asking how water can interact with H2O. It is
a stupid question. The hunt for a solution of the hard problem is often tacitly supposed
to be understood as asking for an explanation in the sense of science of how the mental and
the physical can interact. This is chasing a red herring, because it denies the fundamen-
tal distinction between the mental and the physical and their concomitant fundamentally
different ways of explanation. There can be no such thing as an explanation that jumps
back and forth from one realm to another.
I find this dissolution difficult to understand. If there are two fundamental, distinct
aspects of head-processes, then to declare them identical (contingently or not), seems to
be a contradiction, because identity entails analytically non-distinctness. What is meant by
saying that water is contingently identical to H2O is that it happens to be a fact in this
world that the concepts of water and H2O have an identical referent; they are different
names for the same thing. But does Maxwell really mean to say that mental processes and
brain-processes are two different names for the same thing? If that same thing is ‘head-
processes’, then do we have three names for the same thing? If mental processes and
brain-processes are two distinct aspects of the same thing, namely head-process, then
these two concepts must refer to distinct aspects of head-processes, not to one and the
same aspect, for then we are heading for either idealism or reductionism, both of which
Maxwell rejects. Furthermore, what chemistry and solid state physics teach us about col-
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lections of H2O-molecules explains all the properties of water we are familiar with; but
what neuro-physical and biochemical research tell us about the brain does not, and can-
not, explain anything about mental processes, for Maxwell has allotted them to mutually
exclusive realms of explanation.
To the generic reader of this journal I recommend reading Human nonetheless for a
number of reasons. First, Human is the center-piece of Maxwell’s philosophical triptych:
in Chapter 3 and Appendix 3, the left panel, Universe is summarised, and in Chapter 9,
the right panel, Wisdom is summarised (it deals with a New Enlightenment programme
and the consequences of philosophy for society as a whole); therefore Human provides
the best entrance to Maxwell’s world of thought. Secondly, Human contains a succinct
but certainly not too-detailed overview of the various problems and positions in the cur-
rently flourishing philosophy of mind. Thirdly, it shows that despite the fact that many
philosophers have declared Cartesian Dualism dead time and again, with some adjust-
ments the Cartesian view remains a powerful view that can compete effortlessly with
other extant views — think in this respect also of Searle’s work. Fourthly, the book shows
that the ‘Wittgensteinian move’ from solution to dissolution still deserves serious consider-
ation.
Length of this Essay Review: about 5,000 words.
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